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The Case for Engel
Diego Marconi
Universitá di Torino (Italy)
Résumé : Je m’efforcerai de donner plus de poids aux doutes de Pascal
Engel relatifs à deux affirmations de Timothy Williamson dans Philosophy
of Philosophy : que les expériences de pensée philosophiques portent sur une
possibilité métaphysique par opposition à une possibilité conceptuelle, et que le
raisonnement contrefactuel joue un rôle crucial pour atteindre les conclusions
modales pertinentes dans les arguments fondés sur des expériences de pensée.
Dans le premier cas, je soutiendrai qu’à moins de comprendre la notion de
conceptuel dans un sens psychologique, il est difficile de saisir la différence
entre des expériences de pensée qui « portent sur des concepts » ou possibilités
conceptuelles et des expériences de pensée qui « portent sur des êtres réels »
ou possibilités métaphysiques. Dans le second cas, je soutiendrai qu’il n’est
pas clair que les contrefactuels sont des prémisses indispensables dans des
arguments fondés sur des expériences de pensée ou que le raisonnement
contrefactuel prend l’avantage sur le raisonnement déductif ordinaire pour
atteindre des conclusions modales.
Abstract: I will try to add some weight to Pascal Engel’s doubts about
two claims of Timothy Williamson’s in The Philosophy of Philosophy: that
philosophical thought experiments are about metaphysical possibility as op-
posed to conceptual possibility, and that counterfactual reasoning plays a
crucial role in reaching modal conclusions relevant to arguments based on
thought experiments. In the first case, I will argue that unless the notion of
conceptual is understood psychologically, it is hard to tell the difference be-
tween thought experiments being “about concepts”, or conceptual possibilities,
and their being “about real things”, or metaphysical possibilities. In the
second case, I will argue that it not clear that counterfactuals are indispensable
premises in arguments based on thought experiments, or that counterfactual
reasoning has an epistemological edge over standard deductive reasoning in
reaching modal conclusions.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 21(3), 2017, 111–124.
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In his [Williamson 2007], Timothy Williamson produced a battery of
arguments against the widespread conception that philosophy is conceptual
analysis, and philosophical knowledge—if there is any—is knowledge about
concepts. One of his sub-claims is that philosophical thought experiments
deal with metaphysical, not conceptual possibilities [Williamson 2007, 188,
205–207]; another is that modal knowledge—knowledge of metaphysical possi-
bilities and necessities—does not require any special faculty of modal intuition;
in fact, it is the sort of knowledge we often achieve by way of counterfactual
reasoning, which is itself quite an ordinary business, and “deeply integrated
into our empirical thought in general” [Williamson 2007, 141]. In his article
on thought experiments “in or out of the armchair” [Engel 2011], Pascal Engel
objects to the first claim: he argues that Williamson has not really shown that
no thought experiments bear upon our concepts or about our understanding of
concepts [Engel 2011, 158]. As to the second claim, Engel wonders, somewhat
en passant, whether Williamson’s counterfactuality thesis, i.e.,
There is no more to our modal knowledge of possible facts than
our capacity to handle and evaluate counterfactuals.
[Engel 2011, 151]
really casts any light on such issues as what kind of possibility claims are
involved in thought experiments [Engel 2011, 146], whether such possibilities
are genuine [Engel 2011, 146], and what kind of epistemic access we have to the
situations described in philosophical thought experiments [Engel 2011, 151].
By and large, I am sympathetic with Engel’s criticism. I believe that (i) though
some formulations of thought experiments (or of modal issues in general) may
invite a metaphysical reading while others may invite a conceptual reading,
the metaphysical vs. conceptual issue is hard to decide in general, as much
depends on what is meant by “conceptual”. Furthermore, I believe that (ii)
though bringing modal knowledge back to knowledge based on counterfactual
reasoning may make modal knowledge less arcane, it hardly dissipates the
difficulties that are involved in the evaluation of thought experiments or of
modal claims in general. In genuinely problematic cases, we are not going to
be decisively helped by choosing counterfactual formulations even where we
can do so. In what follows, I will mainly be dealing with (ii). (i) involves vast
issues—indeed, it is the topic of Williamson’s book as a whole—so I will limit
myself to a few comments, much in the spirit of Engel’s remarks.
1 Conceptual vs. metaphysical
For Williamson, the notion of conceivable is a psychological notion. E.g.,
Although there are truths and falsities about conceivability and
inconceivability, they concern our mental capacities.
[Williamson 2007, 135]
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It is then to be expected that something may turn out to be both conceivable
and impossible, for example, physically impossible:
We easily conceive particles violating what are in fact physical
laws. [Williamson 2007, 135]
Indeed, it would be a sort of Darwinian miracle if our psychological abilities
were attuned to deep natural regularities as understood by modern physics.
However, this is not the only way “conceivable” was used in the analytic
tradition. For example:
Of course, here “I can’t imagine the opposite [ich kann mir
das Gegenteil nicht vorstellen]” doesn’t mean: my powers of
imagination are unequal to the task. [Wittgenstein 1953, § 251],
[Wittgenstein 1974, 129]
Similarly, when Gilbert Ryle wrote:
Whatever I do or say, it is always conceivable, though nearly
always false, that I did it, or said it, in complete absence of mind.
[Ryle 1949, 91], [Engel 2011, 151]
he did not mean that I could somehow picture myself as acting or speaking
“in complete absence of mind”. What he meant was that it is not obviously
inconsistent to describe some human action as mechanic, a mere reflex, or
unconsciously executed. In this use, “conceivable” is very close to what
other philosophers meant by “logically possible”, i.e., describable in language
without contradiction [see e.g., Russell 1921, 159–160], [Schlick 1936].
“Conceivable” is an ordinary word that can be philosophically explicated
in several different ways, as became clear in the recent debate concerning
the controversial inference from conceivability to possibility. 1 None of the
proposed explications turned out to be entirely satisfactory, this being perhaps
the main reason why the issue is now somewhat moot. 2 Though “conceivable”
is obviously related to “concept”, it is by no means clear that it is used synony-
mously with “conceptually possible”. Indeed, if “conceivable” is understood
as “imageable”—such as we can form a mental picture of—then objects like
Descartes’s chiliagon would turn out to be conceptually impossible, which is
certainly unintended by most philosophers who use the phrase “conceptually
possible”. More generally, it seems clear that “concept” has both a psycholog-
ical and a non-psychological sense. When we inquire which concepts can be
attributed to our primate predecessors, or which pathologies tend to deprive
us of the concepts of body parts, we are doing biology or neuropsychology and
taking concepts to be categorizing functions in the human mind; whereas when
we wonder whether some thing falls under the concept of chair, our question
is undistinguishable from the question whether that thing is a chair—on the
1. See the papers in [Szabó Gendler & Hawthorne 2002] and the editors’ introduc-
tion, particularly [Szabó Gendler & Hawthorne 2002, 7–9].
2. For criticism of several notions of conceivability, see [Marconi 2009]. For more
fine-grained distinctions within a two-dimensionalist framework [Chalmers 2002].
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face of it, not a psychological question. 3 Elsewhere, I argued that these are
two different notions of concept, that they are irreducible to each other, and
that failure to distinguish them is bound to generate confusion [Marconi 2015].
This is relevant to the issue of whether thought experiments are about concepts
or about “real things”. Williamson argues that if a thought experiment
showed that some state of affair is conceptually possible (e.g., that cases of
justified true belief without knowledge are conceptually possible), that would
be philosophically uninteresting, as it might still be the case that knowledge
is identical with justified true belief of metaphysical necessity [Williamson
2007, 206]. This presupposes a difference between being conceptually possible
and being possible tout court, or metaphysically possible. Engel, in turn,
argues that at least some thought experiments appear to be about concepts:
they test our common concept of X (e.g., of personal identity [Engel 2011,
158], or they “elicit in us our intuitions about two different concepts” of Y
(e.g., of knowledge [Engel 2011, 160]), by having us imagine limit cases that
make the application of our “common concept” of X problematic, or that
discriminate between alternative concepts of Y . This presupposes that thought
experiments are either about concepts or about “real things”, not about both.
Both Williamson’s and Engel’s views are plausible if the psychological notion
of concept is involved. But is it? Did philosophers that meant their thought
experiments to be about concepts, or to whom such a view was attributed, have
the psychological notion in mind? If not, are there good reasons to take their
thought experiments to be about concepts rather than about “real things”?
Traditionally, Wittgenstein’s thought experiments are regarded as typically
about concepts. Engel agrees with the tradition [Engel 2011, 149]. However,
is such a reading obligatory? Let us consider a representative example:
[...] what if they piled the timber in heaps of arbitrary, varying
height and then sold it at a price proportionate to the area covered
by the piles?
And what if they justified this with the words: “Of course, if you
buy more timber, you must pay more”?
How could I shew them that—as I should say—you don’t really
buy more wood if you buy a pile covering a bigger area?—I should,
for instance, take a pile which was small by their ideas and, by
laying the logs around, change it into a “big” one. This might
convince them—but perhaps they would say: “Yes, now it’s a
lot of wood and costs more”—and that would be the end of the
matter. We should presumably say in this case: they simply do
not mean the same by “a lot of wood” and “a little wood” as we
do; and they have a quite different system of payment from us.
[Wittgenstein 1978, I, §§ 149–150]
3. Frege’s notion of concept in [Frege 1891] exemplifies the non-psychological
notion.
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This has been taken to be about the concepts of selling and buying,
measuring, “more of” and “less of”, etc. [e.g., Baker & Hacker 1985, 328-
329], [Glock 1996, 49]. But why not about sales themselves—those very
transactions? Start with the assumption that in sales, the amount paid is
proportional to certain stable features of what is being sold, as measured by
some standard (say, a scale in the case of wood). Now, we show the wood
sellers that the area a pile of wood covers is not a stable feature of that pile
of wood. The wood sellers may be implicitly committed to our conception
of what a sale is, in which case they would retract their method of payment
(“this might convince them”). However, they might also reject the stability re-
quirement (“Now [my it.] it’s a lot of wood and costs more”), thereby showing
that they disagree with us about what sales are. They entertain a partially
different theory of sales.
One might object that this account clashes with Wittgenstein’s conclusive
comment, “They simply do not mean the same by ‘a lot of wood’ and ‘a little
wood’ as we do”. This seems to indicate that the thought experiment reveals
semantic differences between the wood sellers and us, and semantic properties
are Wittgenstein’s explicatum for conceptual features (a concept is just a word
together with its “deep” semantic properties, i.e., norms governing the use of
it). However, he also comments that the wood sellers “have a quite different
system of payment from us”, i.e., a different institution of selling: their sales
are not like our sales, though they are similar in certain respects. When seen
in this light, the wood sellers thought experiment could be read as showing
that sales are not necessarily what we had assumed them to be.
I cannot see any strong reason for seeing it one way or the other.
Wittgenstein’s thought experiments have been interpreted (correctly, I believe)
as part of an anti-essentialist strategy [see e.g., Stroud 1965]. They are aimed
at showing that what we tend to see as metaphysical (“logical”) necessities are
inextricably intertwined with practices, institutions, and (ultimately) facts of
nature: if these were different we might think differently and have different
practices and institutions [Wittgenstein 1953, II, xii]. Seeming necessities are
ultimately contingent: they are motivated, though not necessitated, by the
natural world being the way it is and by certain basic patterns of behavior
and practices having become so entrenched that, for us, they resemble nature
in being spontaneous, automatic, and unquestioned [cf. Wittgenstein 1967,
§ 355]. This conception should not be seen as entailing naturalization, let
alone psychologization of concepts, for two reasons. First of all, Wittgenstein is
generally hostile to any attempt at reducing social or semantic facts to natural
facts in the strict sense (e.g., to physical or biological facts). Secondly, though
concepts are indeed our concepts, they are not mental abilities ultimately
grounded in the biology of the human brain, but structural ingredients of our
Weltbild: they determine how we happen to think and believe we cannot but
think, not how wemust think of natural necessity. So, even if one (legitimately)
takes the wood sellers thought experiment, as well as others, to be about
concepts, there is no reason to take “concept” in the psychological sense.
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2 Thought experiment and counterfactual
conditionals
Suppose we grant that, epistemologically, evaluating modal claims (such as
“It is possible that A”) is on a par with evaluating “counterfactual” claims of
the form “If A were the case, then B would be the case”. 4 Further suppose we
agree that counterfactual reasoning is quite an ordinary business and that we
often take its conclusions to be reliable. Does it follow that controversial modal
claims, or philosophical thought experiments, are really less controversial than
they have been taken to be? Concerning thought experiments in particular,
how crucial is the role of counterfactual reasoning in arguments based on
thought experiments?
2.0.1 Gettier’s thought experiment
Let me start with the second issue. Williamson provides a detailed analysis
of one (and only one) kind of thought experiments, namely Gettier-like thought
experiments. According to his analysis, such thought experiments are aimed
to refute a target claim: the claim that necessarily, one knows that p if and
only if one has a justified true belief that p.
(TC) ∀x ∀p(K(x, p) ≡ JTB(x, p))
The refutation is effected by showing that there are possible cases of justified
true belief that are not cases of knowledge:
(TEc) ♦∃x∃p(JTB(x, p) & ∼K(x, p))
(TEc), in turn, is presented as the conclusion of an argument whose premises
are (a) the possibility of Gettier cases, i.e., the claim that some Gettier stories
might be true; 5 (b) the necessary implication from there being Gettier cases
to there being cases of justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge,
i.e.,
(Imp) ∀x ∀p(GC(x, p)→ (JTB(x, p) & ∼K(x, p)))
From such premises, (TEc) follows by standard modal logic and the target
claim is refuted.
4. I use (just this time) scare quotes around “counterfactual” to remind the reader
that Williamson uses the word for conditionals with a subjunctive antecedent in
general, whether or not they involve a presupposition that the antecedent is false.
See [Williamson 2007, 137].
5. As Williamson sees it, a Gettier case should be described as a situation in which
a true belief is validly derived from false premises, not as a case of justified true belief
without knowledge.
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This looks like a fair presentation of the argumentative structure of
Gettier’s criticism of the “classical” definition of knowledge. Is counterfactual
reasoning involved? So far, not at all. Yet Williamson’s conclusion of his
account of thought experiments is that:
Paradigm thought experiments in philosophy [surely including
Gettier’s] are simply valid arguments about counterfactual pos-
sibilities. [Williamson 2007, 207]
So, how do counterfactual possibilities—as opposed to simple possibilities—get
into the picture?
Williamson reasons as follows. The strict implication (Imp) is both
unnecessarily strong and not “the best representation of the verdict on the
Gettier case”. We don’t want (and don’t need) every Gettier case to be
a case of justified true belief without knowledge. There might be bizarre
circumstances—possible worlds—in which the Gettier mechanism of inferring
true beliefs from false premises doesn’t work as expected; e.g., the inference
itself might cast doubt on the premise, thereby preventing the true conclusion.
We want to exclude such bizarre circumstances (“far away” worlds); this is
achieved by weakening (Imp) to
(Counter) ∃x∃p GC(x, p) → ∀x ∀p(GC(x, p)→ (JTB(x, p)& ∼K(x, p)))
I.e., if there were Gettier cases, then Gettier cases would be cases of
justified true belief without knowledge. This rules out bizarre circumstances:
only “close enough” worlds matter. 6 (TEc) still follows, assuming standard
principles of counterfactual logic. Thus, a better reconstruction of Gettier-like
arguments against (TC) gives pride of place to a counterfactual premise.
Is this enough to justify the emphasis on the role of counterfactual
reasoning in thought experiments? After all, Williamson admits that the
switch from (Imp) to (Counter) may be just the first step down a slippery
slope of successive attempts at guaranteeing that Gettier cases are indeed cases
of justified true belief without knowledge—something we cannot absolutely
guarantee anyway [Williamson 2007, 204]. It is then hard to argue that the
argumentative structure that relies on (Counter) is definitely better than
the alternatives as an account of Gettier’s argument, particularly, better
than the original structure that relies on (Imp) and does not involve any
counterfactuals. But then the motivation for regarding the argumentative
import of Gettier’s thought experiment as essentially relying on counterfactual
reasoning is thin.
6. As Williamson points out, however, even this does not guarantee that every
Gettier case will be a case of justified true belief without knowledge, e.g., if the
actual world contains an abnormal Gettier case that is not a case of justified true
belief without knowledge (as it is not a case of justified true belief to begin with)
[Williamson 2007, 200].
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2.0.2 Another thought experiment
As we saw, Williamson claims that “paradigm thought experiments” are
about counterfactual possibilities. Let us see if his analysis extends to examples
other than Gettier’s. As Engel points out, it is natural to conjecture that
it should, as thought experiments “involve possibilities”—they are based on
imagining possible situations—and “are about possibilities and necessities”,
i.e., they refute allegedly necessary claims by exhibiting contradicting possi-
bilities [Engel 2011, 157]. The first point is unassailable; the second, as we
shall see, is not equally secure.
I will choose to consider Searle’s “Chinese room” thought experiment,
which I take to be no less “paradigmatic” than Gettier’s, though more contro-
versial and somewhat harder to analyze. Gettier’s argument is straightforward:
the target claim is clear, the envisaged situations may be awkward but their
possibility is rarely challenged (as both Williamson and Engel note, there
are even actual Gettier cases) [Williamson 2007, 192], [Engel 2011, 154], and
most people—or most Western philosophers—tend to agree that, given that
Gettier cases are possible, the conclusion (TEc) follows and the target claim is
refuted. With the Chinese room, things are messier. The thought experiment
is meant to refute a thesis that Searle characterizes as the “strong AI” claim
and formulates as follows:
Appropriately programmed computers [...] can be literally said to
understand and have other cognitive states. [Searle 1980, 417]
We might then be tempted to attribute to Searle’s argument the same structure
that appeared to fit Gettier’s:
– S1. (TargetClaim) Necessarily, appropriately programmed devices
understand natural language. 7
– S2. Necessarily, to be a programmed device is to be a symbol
manipulating system. 8
– S3. We can imagine a symbol manipulating system (the man in
the room) that does not understand the natural language symbols it
manipulates.
– S4. Hence, the “strong AI” claim S1 is false.
However, this is not at all what Searle intends to show and believes his thought
experiment to have shown. He doesn’t want to show that programmed devices
may or may not understand language; he wants to show that no such device
could ever understand language, for any such device is like the man in the room
in every relevant respect (i.e., a mere symbol manipulator), and—obviously—
the man in the room does not understand the language whose symbols he is
manipulating. I.e., he wants to show that
(ChR) Necessarily, no programmed devices understand natural
language.
7. I will adopt this simplification of the “strong AI” claim as in fact Searle only
deals with language understanding, not with cognitive states in general.
8. This is to be read as a biconditional.
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If (TargetClaim) is ∀x (PDx→ Ux), what Searle wants to prove is not its
contradictory as in the proposed reconstruction, i.e.,
♦∃x(PDx & ∼Ux)
but rather its contrary,
(ChR) ∼ ♦∃x(PDx & Ux).
It is then natural to reinterpret the target claim—the thesis of “strong AI”
that Searle is attacking—as directly contradicted by (ChR), i.e., as
(TargetClaim∗) ♦∃x(PDx & Ux)
which, by the way, much better suits actual views Searle may have had in
mind.
But now, what is the overall structure of Searle’s argument? Even
assuming that the Chinese room is a possible situation, how can he show that
the man in the room is representative of every possible computing device?
What he needs is an additional premise, namely that necessarily, no symbol
manipulating device has cognitive powers that exceed the man in the room’s: if
the man in the room doesn’t understand, then no symbol manipulating system
does. The structure of Searle’s argument can then be reconstructed as follows:
– S′1. ♦∃x(PDx & Ux) [TargetClaim∗]
– S′2. ∀x(PDx → SMDx) [being a programmed device entails being a
symbol manipulating system]
– S′3. ♦∃x((SMDx & ∼Ux) & ∀y(SMDy → (Uy → Ux)))
[Hypothesis]
– S′4. ♦∃x((SMDx & ∼Ux) & ∀y(SMDy →∼ Uy)) [from S′3]
– S′5. ∀y(SMDy →∼Uy) [from S′4, assuming S5]
– S′6. ∼ ♦∃x(PDx & Ux) [from S′2, S′5].
This structure is quite different from the structure of Gettier’s argument.
First, the target claim S′1 is not a necessitated conditional but a possible
existentially quantified conjunction, so that what needs to be proved to refute
it is the necessitated conditional S′5. Secondly, the premise S′3 does not
just assert the “verdict” of the Chinese room thought experiment but the
crucial paradigmatic character of the Chinese room system. The possibility of
a symbol manipulating system that does not understand language does not by
itself prove that no other such system could, unless it is also assumed that no
symbol manipulating system can exceed the man in the room’s understanding
abilities. Otherwise, it could be retorted that though the man in the room
is indeed unable to understand, other, differently programmed devices might
not share such inability. Indeed, this is what many partisans of AI objected
to Searle in the original debate (see e.g., Dennett’s, Fodor’s, Lycan’s, and
Pylyshyn’s contributions in [Searle 1980]. 9
9. More precisely, these critics objected to either S′2 or S′3 in the argument
above depending on whether they understood “symbol manipulating system” in a
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Is there any room for counterfactual reasoning in Searle’s argument so
reconstructed? Paralleling Williamson’s considerations, we might want to rule
out bizarre worlds in which—say—the man in the room’s physical manipula-
tions of written scribbles systematically affect his mental states in such a way
that he does understand the symbols he is handling. I.e., we might want to
weaken the thought experiment’s “verdict” (that does not explicitly appear in
the above reconstruction) from
(ImpChR) ∀x(CRx→ (SMDx & ∼Ux))
To
(CounterChR) ∃xCRx → ∀x(CRx→ (SMDx & ∼ Ux))
i.e., “If there were Chinese rooms, then a Chinese room would be a symbol
manipulating device that doesn’t understand language”. However, this would
not affect the crucial, highly controversial assumption that no mere symbol
manipulator could exceed the man in the room’s understanding powers. We
surely don’t want to restrict the operation of mere symbol manipulators
to normal, close-to-home circumstances: clearly, Searle wants his result to
concern any (mere) symbol manipulator. Indeed, he comes very close to
making the negative connection between being a symbol manipulator and
understanding into an a priori necessary connection:
As soon as we knew that [a robot’s] behavior was the result
of a formal program [...] we would abandon the assumption of
intentionality. [Searle 1980, 421]
None of this contradicts Williamson’s claim that counterfactuals have a role
to play in philosophical thought experiments. Even in the Chinese room case,
the experiment’s “verdict” can arguably take counterfactual form. However,
as the Chinese room also shows, the verdict alone may not provide a refutation
of the target thesis. To that effect, further assumptions may be needed that
cannot be immediately drawn from examining the imagined situation (though
they may be suggested or made vivid by it, as Searle clearly hoped they
would). It seems that, at least in the Chinese room case, for such assumptions
counterfactual weakening is not in order.
2.1 Counterfactual reasoning and the rejection of
thought experiments
Gettier-like situations are clearly possible. Indeed, there are actual, hence
possible Gettier cases. Other thought experiments confront us with more
narrow sense (in which case they rejected S′2, holding that not every programmed
device must be a mere symbol manipulating system) or in a more inclusive sense (in
which case they rejected the second conjunct of S′3, holding that not every symbol
manipulating system must share the man in the room’s limitations).
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problematic situations. For example, could there be such a planet as Twin
Earth? Since the beginning, it was pointed out that no substance molecularly
very different from water could have every superficial property of water [Kuhn
1989, 27]. It could be added that Oscar1 and Oscar2 cannot be identical
“molecule by molecule”, as Oscar1 is about 65% H2O whereas Oscar2 is (in
the same proportion) XYZ. Thus, the situation we are asked to imagine is
scientifically impossible: no planet that conforms to the laws of nature could
be like Twin Earth, but even if there were such a planet, it could not contain
a molecular twin of a human being of Earth.
Similarly with the Chinese room. As far as we know, it is not possible that,
“after a while”, a human being “gets so good at following the instructions for
manipulating Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at writing
the instructions that [...][the man’s] answers to the questions are absolutely
indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speakers” [Searle 1980, 418];
see Richard Hofstadter’s objections in [Searle 1980, 433–434]. Remember, the
man is supposed to identify strings of symbols and relate them to other strings
by their form alone: the level of performance Searle imagines far exceeds the
limitations of human memory. There can’t be any Chinese room that fits
Searle’s description.
Prima facie, showing that a situation that a thought experiment asks us
to imagine is physically or biologically impossible looks like a good reason to
forget about the thought experiment, for the assumption that the imagined
situation is a genuine possibility is bound to be crucial in any argument based
on it. Why is it that, on the contrary, we tend to discount impossibility
objections? An interesting question. Williamson raises a related issue: it may
happen that the situation we are asked to imagine in a thought experiment
just lacks the features that are required to reach the desired “verdict”, i.e.,
to function as a counterexample to the target claim. For example, it is
a pseudo-Gettier case: not a case in which a true belief is validly derived
from false premises. The reason of such inadequacy may be trivial, and the
thought experiment easy to repair. In such cases, “the similarity of the new
thought experiment to the old one is evidence that the old one was not far
wrong” [Williamson 2007, 201]. Perhaps we reason in the same way with
allegedly impossible situations, such as Twin Earth or the Chinese room: we
feel that though the situations we are asked to imagine appear to be impossible,
“something pretty much like that is going to work”. Well, is it? Perhaps in
some cases, not necessarily in every case. With Twin Earth, perhaps aluminum
and molybdenum will work. 10 With the Chinese room, we seem to be forced
to replace the man in the room with some superhuman being that would be,
10. Actually, there would be problems even there. Both aluminium and molybde-
num are present in the human body in tiny proportions (aluminium, 0.000015%,
molybdenum, 4.5 × 10−8%). However, molybdenum is essential to human life
(aluminium is not), so if on Twin Earth molybdenum where everywhere replaced
by aluminium, but not vice versa, there would be no Oscar2. Notice that trouble is
bound to arise in any case, for molybdenum’s essentiality for human life depends on
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however, sufficiently like us to allow plausible conclusions about his/her not
understanding Chinese. Ultimately, this amounts to a partial suspension of
natural laws; but when natural laws are suspended, everything—or anyway,
a lot—goes. 11 Hence, either we choose to appeal to a notion of possibility
such that scientific impossibility does not entail impossibility tout court, or we
should declare the Chinese room a failed thought experiment.
Be that as it may, when we reach the conclusion that a situation we are
asked to imagine is impossible what we reach—if our argument is sound-
is modal knowledge. Is it reached by way of counterfactual reasoning? It
certainly could be so presented. For example, in the Twin Earth case we
might reach the impossibility conclusion by evaluating the counterfactual
conditional (TwE):
(TwE) If Twin Earth existed, 12 no human being of Earth would
be molecularly identical to any human being of Twin Earth.
Alternatively, we could assume a description of Twin Earth (e.g., as per fn. 12)
and, given some chemical and biological knowledge, derive a contradiction from
the hypothesis that some human being of Earth is molecularly identical with
some human being of Twin Earth. Assuming a certain amount of scientific
knowledge has roughly the same effect as ruling out “bizarre” worlds, as
we do by adopting the counterfactual formulation (TwE). Is there any
epistemological advantage of counterfactual reasoning over standard deductive
reasoning? As Williamson points out [Williamson 2007, 143], counterfactual
reasoning uses imagination, constrained by perception and knowledge of how
nature works; it may use folk physics, perhaps not expressible in propositional
form but “stored in the form of some analogue mechanism” such as a neural
network [Williamson 2007, 145]. Indeed. However, nothing of this seems
relevant in the present case. It seems that, whether we are trying to
establish the truth of (TwE) or to prove by deductive argument that the
Twin Earth hypothesis is inconsistent with the properties attributed to the
Oscars, we reason in essentially the same way, using the same bits of scientific
knowledge. We make no use of perception or folk science, we do not execute
any simulation, and even imagination appears to play, at most, an auxiliary,
heuristic role. Thus, I can’t see any epistemological advantage of counterfac-
tual reasoning in this case.
Of course, I am well aware that this conclusion does not generalize to
all modal issues that arise in connection with thought experiments, let alone
to all instances of modal knowledge. There may be thought experiments
its presence in certain compounds. Even if it could be replaced by aluminium, the
effects would not be the same.
11. A point that was forcefully made by Hilary Putnam [Putnam 1990, 69–70] while
reaching the conclusion that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for being
water in all possible worlds, including worlds that obey different natural laws.
12. This abbreviates the statement “If there were a planet that is exactly like
the Earth, except that water is everywhere replaced by a superficially similar but
molecularly quite different liquid”.
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(Mary comes to mind) where imagination and simulation play a major role.
Nevertheless, Williamson’s own generalization that the evaluation of coun-
terfactuals is crucial in arguments based on “paradigm” thought experiments
seems to me ungrounded.
3 Conclusion
I have been trying to add substance to Pascal Engel’s doubts about two
claims of Timothy Williamson’s in The Philosophy of Philosophy [Williamson
2007]: that philosophical thought experiments are about metaphysical possi-
bility as opposed to conceptual possibility, and that counterfactual reasoning
plays a crucial role in reaching modal conclusions relevant to arguments
based on thought experiments. In the first case, I argued that unless the
notion of conceptual is understood psychologically, it is hard to tell the
difference between thought experiments’ being “about concepts”, or conceptual
possibilities, and their being “about real things”, or metaphysical possibilities.
In the second case, I argued that it is far from clear that counterfactuals are
indispensable premises in arguments based on thought experiments, and that
it is not generally true that counterfactual reasoning has an epistemological
edge over standard deductive reasoning in reaching modal conclusions (e.g.,
the conclusion that the situation a thought experiment asks us to imagine is
impossible). While I believe Engel would agree with me concerning the role
and import of counterfactuals, he might disagree about the possibility of a
distinction between conceptual and metaphysical interpretations of thought
experiments even where the notion of conceptual is not understood as psycho-
logical; this is for him to tell.
I realize that the article I chose as my point of departure is a tiny fraction
of Pascal’s immense philosophical production. Nevertheless, even here he fully
displays the acumen, subtlety and critical spirit for which he is well known in
the analytic community (and beyond). I am glad to have picked this particular
intersection between his philosophical interests and mine (one among many)
to celebrate his birthday.
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